Many states require children to reach age five by a specified date in the calendar year in order to begin kindergarten. We use birth certificate records from 1999 to 2004 to assess whether parents systematically time childbirth before these eligibility cutoff dates to capture the option value of sending their child to school at a relatively young age, thereby avoiding a year of child care costs. Testing for discontinuities in the distribution of births around cutoff dates, we find no evidence that the option value influences the timing of birth. Similarly, we find no systematic discontinuities in average mothers' characteristics or babies' health outcomes around cutoff dates. Timing in the neighborhood of eligibility cutoffs occurs only when the cutoffs coincide with weekends or holidays, which may have implications for recent research that assumes birth dates in the neighborhood of cutoffs are essentially randomly assigned.
Introduction
The use of technologies that allow for the manipulation of birth timing, such as induction of labor and scheduled cesarean sections, is widespread in the United States. The motivation for such manipulation relies on a cost-benefit analysis involving possible health effects, scheduling preferences, and incentives provided by tax structures and medical institutions. In this paper, we attempt to establish whether the timing of childbirth depends on financial incentives provided by public education age eligibility requirements. Forty-three states in the U.S. impose statewide cutoff rules that require children to have reached their fifth birthday before a specific day to be eligible to begin public kindergarten each fall. For example, in California a child must turn five on or before December 2 to be eligible to enroll in the fall of that year. A birth before the cutoff date gives parents the option to send their children to kindergarten five years in the future, thereby substantially reducing the monetary and time costs of child care in the sixth year. These incentives can be large, as estimates suggest that average out-of-pocket child care expenses among parents with children under age five who use child care are more than seven percent of monthly income. 1 The option bears no obligation because parents can always decide to "redshirt" a child by not sending her to kindergarten when first eligible.
Although anecdotal evidence suggests that parents respond to these incentives by altering the timing of birth, no previous studies quantify this response using the population of births in the United States. However, previous research shows that parents time birth in response to a variety of other financial incentives. For example, parents in the United States (Dickert-Conlin and Chandra, 1999) and Japan (Wataru and Wakabayashi, 2008) facing high tax benefits of an additional child are more likely to have children at the end of the calendar year rather than at the beginning. In response to the Australian government instituting a $3000 payment for all children born on or after July 1, 2004, more Australian children were born on July 1 "than on any other single date in the past thirty years" (Gans and Leigh, 2009) . As these cases illustrate, parents and medical professionals are clearly willing to manipulate the timing of birth in response to nonmedical incentives.
Birth timing behavior around school cutoff dates also plays a crucial role in the rapidly expanding literature that uses a child's birth date as a potentially exogenous source of variation in her age relative to her grade level. A number of recent studies (for example, Bedard and Dhuey, 2006; Berlinski et al., 2008; Black et al., 2008; Datar, 2006a; Elder and Lubotsky, 2009; McCrary and Royer, 2008; McEwan and Shapiro, 2008; and Stipek, 2002) argue that the timing of births around state cutoff dates is essentially random. Some of these papers generate histograms of birth densities around cutoffs (Berlinski et al., 2008 for Argentina; McEwan and 1 Using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation, the U.S. Census Bureau estimates that in 2006, average monthly child care expenses were 7 percent of monthly income for all children age 15 or younger and 9 percent for all children aged five or younger (http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/childcare.html). Giannarelli and Barsimantov (2000) estimate child care expenses to be 9 8 percent of income earnings for children age 5 to 12 and 10 percent of earnings for children under age 5 in the 1997 National Survey of American Families. In the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study (ECLS), 55 percent of families pay for child care outside the home, at an average annual cost of roughly $2500 in 1998 dollars (Datar, 2006b ).
Shapiro, 2008 for Chile) and find no clear discontinuities in birth counts upon inspection. Others (Berlinski et al., 2008; Black et al., 2008; McCrary and Royer, 2008; McEwan and Shapiro, 2008) test for randomness by checking for smoothness in the average values of observable covariates such as parental education and race at the cutoff dates. These recent births occurred in a medical environment in which more than 30 percent of all weekday births occur via cesarean section and/or induced labor.
Before proceeding to our more formal statistical analysis, we first consider graphical evidence based on the population of birth certificates from the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) that include information on exact date of birth. Consider the pattern of births in 2000 in Figure 1A . Compared to a "typical" day in that year, roughly 20 percent more births occurred on September 1 while roughly 20 percent fewer births fell on September 2. At first glance, this large discontinuity suggests that cutoff-based birth timing is widespread, but it actually results from a much more empirically relevant pattern -in every year, there are large declines in births on weekends and on Labor Day. September 1 fell on a Friday in 2000, so it was followed by large declines in birth rates for three days, the first two being the weekend and the third being Labor Day. Because Labor Day always falls on the first Monday in September, this three-day dip recurs annually, in addition to a two-day dip that corresponds to the other weekend in this 15-day window. In 2003, a naïve look at the Figure   would suggest that parents time births so that they occur after September 1, given that there is roughly a 42 percentage-point increase in births between the first and second of the month, but this again reflects a weekly pattern of increases in births from Sunday to Monday. Figure 1B shows the distribution of births in the neighborhood of September 1 for states that do not have a school cutoff in the August 25 through September 8 window. This figure   clearly shows the same patterns found in Figure 1A , with a large negative discontinuity in 2000
and a large positive one in 2003.
A comparison of Figures 1A and 1B provides the intuition behind the "difference in discontinuities" empirical approach that we present below. We compare birth patterns surrounding school cutoff dates in states where the cutoffs apply to those in states where the cutoffs do not apply. 4 As a graphical analog of this approach, we interpret the differences in the discontinuities in the two figures as the true effect of the school cutoff laws on birth timing. respectively. Curiously, no previous authors have found discontinuities in maternal education at binding cutoff dates using empirical specifications analogous to Figure 2A , but this may be explained by authors aggregating to monthly averages that smooth discontinuities or by pooling many years of data, thereby averaging out day-of-week effects. Regardless, we argue below that such specifications, which use data in the neighborhood of cutoffs only in states in which the cutoffs actually apply, are unsuitable for assessing whether cutoff-based timing exists because of day-of-week and holiday effects. We instead focus on the difference in discontinuities approach. cutoff dates in some years, these patterns exist merely because of the day of the week on which cutoffs fall.
The conclusiveness of our results relies on the high-quality data that we introduce in the next section. In Section 3, we show the dramatic incidence of birth timing in general. After establishing that births are increasingly timed to avoid weekends and holidays, we proceed to Section 4 for our analysis of whether births are timed in response to school cutoff dates. We conclude in Section 5 with a discussion of our findings and their implications.
Data
Since 1985 
Timing of Births
Given the uncertainties in timing conception nine months in advance and in a baby's natural arrival conditional on that conception, our discussion of birth timing primarily refers to medically manipulating the timing of birth through cesarean section deliveries and inducement of labor. 6 A cesarean section requires a surgical incision through the mother's abdomen and uterus to retrieve the baby. Induction of labor is the process of using hormones to stimulate uterine contractions before the spontaneous onset of labor.
Both of these methods allow discretion over timing and may be easily justified by This is a complex decision that should be carefully considered and discussed with the doctor."
Timing is more precise with a scheduled cesarean section than with an induced labor because of uncertainty in the length of time between the onset of induction and birth, although this is almost never more than 48 hours. The NCHS data include "day of week" measures that are apparently coded inaccurately in some years of the data, since they conflict with the reported birth date. For example, among births occurring on September 3, 2000 (a Sunday), nearly 6 percent have "Monday" as the listed day of the week. We treat the reported date as the "truth" and generate a day of the week variable based on this measure in our analyses. 8 Results for all years, which are quantitatively similar, are available from the authors upon request. These correlations between weekday births and birth outcomes are well documented. For example, see Chandra et al. (2004) , Dowding et al. (1987) , Gans and Leigh (2009), Gould et al. (2003) , Hendry (1981) , Luo et al. (2004) , MacFarlane (1978) , Mangold (1981), and Mathers (1983) . In related work, Buckles and Hungerman (2008) document differential patterns in demographic characteristics of the parents over the calendar year.
not African-American. Babies born on weekdays are healthier on a variety of dimensions: they receive earlier prenatal care, they are older in gestational weeks, they are heavier, and they receive higher APGAR scores, which are ten-point summary measures of health at birth.
Perhaps most striking, 43 percent of all weekend births involve the mother's first delivery, as measured by the binary variable First Born, compared to only 37 percent among Monday births.
This differential suggests that experienced parents may be more willing to proactively time births relative to first-time parents or are responding to medical conditions revealed in earlier pregnancies that justify precisely timed subsequent deliveries. The baby's gender is unrelated to the day of the week a birth occurs, but all other weekend-weekday differentials in the table are statistically significant at conventional levels; for example, the t-statistic associated with the hypothesis of no differences in average maternal age between weekends and weekdays is 83.3.
As evidence that medical interventions are the principal mechanisms driving birth timing, Table 3 shows the probability of medical interventions by day of the week. In 1999, 10.4 percent of all births on Sundays involved induction of labor, less than half of the rate among Tuesday births. Overall, the incidence of induction increased slightly from 1999 to 2004. Cesarean sections are also relatively more likely to occur during weekdays, and the trend over time is particularly dramatic -the proportion of births via cesarean section increased from 21.6 percent of all births in 1999 to 28.8 percent in 2004, a one-third increase in only five years. Finally, the births most likely to be scheduled in advance are repeat cesarean sections, because a primary cesarean section often leads to a scheduled cesarean delivery for subsequent births. Table 3 shows that the rate of repeat cesarean sections increased by nearly 40 percent from 1999 to 2004, and the weekday rate of repeat cesarean deliveries was nearly 2.5 times the weekend rate by
2004. By 2004, more than 35 percent of mid-week births were either repeat cesareans or inductions.
9 Tables 1 through 3 provide compelling evidence that births can be precisely timed within short windows and that this timing is related to observable characteristics of mothers and babies.
It is apparent that the timing of births in the neighborhood of school cutoff dates is technologically feasible. We turn next to direct evidence on whether parents and doctors choose to do so.
Do School Cutoff Dates Affect the Timing of Birth?
Our empirical strategy involves a comparison of patterns in births and characteristics of mothers and babies in states where a cutoff is in place with states where there is no cutoff in place. Among the 43 states with explicit state-level cutoffs, we consider five separate cutoff dates that are spaced at least two weeks apart. These dates are September 1, September 30, October 15, December 2, and December 31, each of which is relevant for over five percent of all children born in the U.S. and together apply to 29 states (Appendix Table 1 lists these states). To see the need for dropping some states from the analysis, note that Michigan, which has a December 1 cutoff, would not be a valid control group for the timing of births around December 2, which is the cutoff in California. Similarly, states with cutoffs within two weeks of September 1 will not be valid control cases for the timing of births around September 1. While dropping these states reduces our sample to approximately 75 percent of all births in states with cutoff laws in place, this sample inclusion criteria permits a clean identification strategy by yielding control cases whose distributions of births and characteristics are unlikely to be affected by cutoff dates in the treatment states. 10 Appendix Table 2 summarizes these data for all 12 million births in the sample and 6.7 million higher order births and confirms that the characteristics of these 29 states are similar to all states that have state-level cutoffs, as shown in Tables 1 and 3 .
Tests of continuity in the density of births around school cutoff dates
We begin our analysis by asking whether the incentives to meet school cutoff deadlines alter patterns of birth counts, as measured by the share of births in a given year in state s that occurs on calendar date d: 
In (2), d sd is a cardinal measure of calendar time, so that in a state with a cutoff of September 1, on September 3 the value of (d sd -c) is 2, and births on that day would contribute to estimation of the density of births after the cutoff but not on or before it. A sd is a binary indicator of whether the date in question falls after the cutoff (that is, A sd = 1 if (d sd -c)>0, and zero otherwise), so γ is the parameter of interest -it measures the discontinuity in the histogram of share sd at the cutoff.
Although an estimate of model (2) would measure a discontinuity in the density of births at a given entrance cutoff, the patterns in Figures 1A and 1B above suggest that the findings from such a model may merely stem from the effects of day of the week, holidays, or other unmeasured factors that influence birth timing. A cleaner strategy involves the comparison of behavior around a cutoff between states that actually use that cutoff and states that do not, that is, the analog of the difference in discontinuities between Figures 1A and 1B. We therefore estimate the following model:
12 McCrary (2007) finds that the choice of bin size in this first stage matters little in most applications, and our results are insensitive to aggregating to two-day bins. 13 One could also estimate global polynomial models in order to smooth the estimated histogram of share sd , but local linear models are asymptotically more efficient and focus attention on behavior near the cutoffs, which is intuitively appealing. Fan and Gibjels (1996) provide a general discussion of local linear regression and its advantages relative to other parametric and nonparametric approaches. 
where R sd is a binary indicator of whether the date d lies in the neighborhood of the cutoff for state s. β 6 is the key parameter in this model, measuring the difference in the discontinuity in birth shares at a particular cutoff for states in which the cutoff is binding (R sd = 1) versus states in which it is not (R sd = 0). Note that data from two states with different cutoffs is sufficient to identify β 6 . For example, with birth counts in California (which has a December 2 cutoff) and Illinois (with a September 1 cutoff) from August 15 to September 15, the California data identifies the β 0 through β 3 parameters, while Illinois births identify the remaining β parameters.
β 6 measures the magnitude of the discontinuity in the density of births in Illinois around September 1 relative to the same discontinuity in California. Finally, the model includes indicators for days of the week, New Year's Day, and Labor Day as additional controls X sd . In practice, excluding these controls modestly reduces precision but does not substantively affect the point estimates in the difference in discontinuities models.
14 Estimates of the parameters of equation (3) will typically be sensitive to the choice of bandwidth, with smaller bandwidths reducing bias but decreasing precision. Although one may use formal cross-validation methods for bandwidth selection, we adopt Fan and Gijbels's (1996) rule-of-thumb selector and also estimate models with a variety of bandwidths in order to assess the sensitivity of the estimates. This is equivalent to varying the width of windows that define our estimation sample, and below we report results based on windows of 29 days (that is, including observations within 14 days of the cutoff on both sides) and 15 days.
14 Similarly, the inclusion of state or cutoff fixed effects does not meaningfully alter any of the point estimates, so the results are based on models that do not include these indicators. Appendix Table 2 lists the full set of estimates of equation (3) based on the "all births" sample. 
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Last comment of referee 1 (5k). Does it make sense to say the 14 day window makes sense given the In addition to estimating model (3) on all the births in 29 states, we use the patterns in Table 3 to choose three subsamples of births where timing is most prevalent. We select higher order births that are (1) repeat cesarean sections, (2) repeat cesareans or inductions, and (3) repeat cesareans or inductions for college educated women. To see why we focus on collegeeducated women, recall that Table 3 shows a positive relationship between education and the likelihood of a weekday birth, perhaps because highly educated mothers are relatively likely to have access to physicians who manage their care closely. We also expect more highly educated parents to be more well-informed about school age eligibility laws. However, the option to send a child to school may be less valuable for more highly educated parents if they prefer to have their child be among the oldest in the classroom or if the benefits of one fewer year of paid child care are lower for parents with higher education.
15 Table 4 shows estimates of equation (3), with the first column pooling all years (and including year-specific indicators) and the remaining columns showing estimates of β 6 separately by year. The first row includes all births occurring in a 29 day window centered at the cutoff date. The coefficient estimate in the model that includes all six years is -0.012, indistinguishable from zero at conventional significance levels. To get a sense of the magnitude of this coefficient, recall that the variable share sd measures daily birth rates relative to a "typical" day, so an estimate of -0.012 implies a discontinuity of 1.2 percent of the daily average number of births.
Assume that this discontinuity results from 0.6 percent of the births that would normally occur one day after a cutoff being moved one day earlier. In 2004, roughly 10,000 births occurred 15 Elizabeth Graue (in Simms and Erikson, 2002) goes as far as proposing that "some families, mostly well-off and white, plan conception of their children to give them 'better' birthdays -birthdays in the fall and winter -so they are among the oldest in their class." However, looking at quarter of birth, Bedard and Dhuey (2006) find no evidence that the more educated mothers are timing fall and winter births. Hungerman and Buckles (2008) find strong patterns that more highly educated women are less likely to have winter births than mothers with less education.
daily in states with cutoff laws in place, so a literal interpretation of the point estimate implies that 60 births in the United States (out of 4.3 million annual deliveries) are moved annually in response to school eligibility requirements. From another perspective, the data are inconsistent with even modest amounts of birth timing -at the 5 percent significance level we can reject that β 6 ≤ -0.038, which would correspond to roughly 190 births being moved annually.
As a final way to interpret the magnitudes of the estimates in Table 4 , recall the patterns by day of the week shown in Table 1 To address the possibility that aggregating years masks informative patterns within years, Table 4 also shows the estimates from equation (3) for each of the six years separately. The point estimates are negative in four of the six years we consider (2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003) , positive in the other two, and statistically insignificant at the five percent level in every case.
Clearly, these patterns provide no compelling evidence that the timing of births is manipulated.
Specifications that limit the sample to births that are most likely to be timed also show no evidence of systematic timing among states with binding cutoffs. In the second row of Table 4 , we show that among all repeat cesarean births, the discontinuity is positive in three of the six years and negative in the other three years. None of these coefficients are statistically significant at standard levels. Similarly, no estimates are statistically significant in the specifications among higher order births that were either repeat cesarean sections or induced labor, regardless of whether the samples are limited to college-educated mothers. Finally, the bottom panel of the table presents estimates based on specifications including births in 15 day windows centered at cutoff dates. These estimates generate similar conclusions to those based on the 29 day windows, with none being statistically distinguishable from zero. Not surprisingly, the standard errors increase in all cases.
In order to investigate whether the linearity assumptions in model (3) mask interesting patterns in the data, we estimate complementary models that include separate indicators for seven days before and after all included cutoffs:
For example, the indicator D sd3 equals one on dates three days after any of the five cutoffs, so that D sd3 equals one for September 4 th in all states and all years because September 1 st is a cutoff in our sample. D sd3 also equals one for October 3, October 18, December 5, and January 3, and is zero for all other days of the year for all states. R sd is again equal to one in the neighborhood of the actual cutoff for state s, and zero otherwise. The coefficients of interest are the γ j terms, which measure whether the share of births on a day near a cutoff are different for states with the cutoff compared to states where the cutoff does not apply. Note that these specifications include all births in a calendar year, and the vector X sd includes an indicator for whether a birth occurred after the cutoff so that the omitted category includes births prior to cutoffs.
For the full sample of births, Figure 3 presents these results graphically together with the linear estimates from model (3). In the figure, the cutoffs are denoted by "Day 0". Each data point represents an estimate of γ j in a particular year, with j ranging from -7 to 7, and the
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So, for the dec 31 cutoff, there is no "after" because all the after dates are in the next calendar year? estimated regression lines from the 29-day window "all births" samples of Table 4 overlay these points. On the whole, the variation in birth rates in the neighborhood of entrance cutoffs appears to merely reflect noise in daily birth rates. More births occurred on the cutoff date than on the following day in three years (1999, 2000, and 2001 ), but in the other three years show the opposite pattern.
Tests of continuity in the average of birth-level observable covariates
The results from the preceding subsection imply that the timing of, at most, very few births are manipulated in order to "beat" the school cutoff dates; however, it is still possible that the incentives to meet the deadline alter the type of births that occur before and after the cutoff.
To consider this question, we take advantage of the large amount of maternal and infant information in the vital statistics data. Our estimation strategy is similar to that used in the estimation of the density of births, except that here we analyze discontinuities in average outcomes. The outcomes broadly fall into three categories: birth procedures, maternal characteristics, and infant characteristics. Again we fit linear regression functions within small windows of data centered at eligibility cutoff dates: 
where sd Y refers to the average value of an outcome in state s on date d. 16 Column (1) of Table 5 displays estimates of 6  for a variety of outcomes for all births based on data pooled across 1999
to 2004 (year-specific estimates are listed in Appendix Table 3 ). Shaded cells indicate estimates that are statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level. The rows labeled "Birth 16 We opt to estimate model (5) with data aggregated to the (state × day of birth) level rather than with individual level data, as within-state and within-date variation in outcomes does not contribute to the estimates. As noted by Lee and Card (2008) , such variation in outcomes among those with identical values of the "running variable" in regression discontinuity designs can bias estimates of standard errors if ignored, so we opt to discard it entirely.
Comment [t20]:
This is related to both referees' comments.
Procedures" correspond to estimates of discontinuities in the probability of birth procedures such as inductions, cesarean sections, and repeat cesarean sections. Note that these estimates are closely related to those from equation (3) in which the birth counts were limited to those that involved specific obstetrical procedures. The estimates show a negative discontinuity of 0.008 in the probability of inductions, implying that the probability of an induction is approximately 0.8 percent higher on or before a binding cutoff date than immediately afterward. Although this estimate is consistent with mothers using inducement of labor to beat school entrance cutoffs, it is insignificantly different from zero. Similarly, the estimates for cesarean sections and repeat cesareans are small and insignificant, with repeat cesareans being 0.2 percentage points more common just after cutoff dates than before.
Among the other characteristics listed in the table, there are no consistent patterns other than the fact that most estimates are precisely estimated zeros. For example, mothers of babies born just before cutoff dates have 0.003 more years of education than mothers of babies born just afterward. The standard deviation of mothers' education in the pooled-year sample is roughly 2.85, so this coefficient of 0.0530 corresponds to only a 0.001 standard deviation effect.
Similarly, the discontinuities in childrens' health outcomes such as birth weight and gestational age are both statistically and practically insignificant. Note that the expected signs on the infant health measures are not obvious ex ante. One might expect that only healthy babies' births are moved forward to beat school cutoff dates, implying a negative discontinuity for birth weight.
On the other hand, all else equal, babies whose birth dates are manipulated to be earlier are mechanically of lower gestational age, so we might expect a positive discontinuity because age and birth weight are positively correlated. In any case, the estimates provide no evidence that babies' health is jeopardized by birth timing around school cutoffs.
Column (2) of Table 5 presents results based only on higher order births. Although we would expect evidence of birth timing to be strongest in this subsample, again no clear patterns emerge. None of the estimates is significantly different from zero. However, as in column (1), the point estimate for inductions, -0.009, is suggestive that mothers use inductions to move births before cutoff dates. In order to further investigate this possibility, we estimate models of induction rates analogous to those in (4) above: On the whole, the evidence from six years of data based on the population of births in 29
states provides no evidence that births are systematically timed to occur before state-level kindergarten entrance cutoff dates. First, Wwe find no clear patterns in the based on either the number of births occurring around school cutoffs, which is not consistent with other literature (Gans and Leigh, 2009 and Chandra, 1999) that finds large discontinuities in daily birth rates in response to timing incentives. or characteristics of those births, including obstetric procedures, demographics of mothers, or infant health outcomes. However, the number of births might be smooth around the cutoffs if hospitals perfectly offset those births that are moved forward by mothers timing for school cutoff purposes by delaying other births until after cutoff dates. These offsetting births would presumably involve mothers who are indifferent about giving birth before or after the cutoff dates and therefore we might expect them to be observationally different than mothers who give birth before the cutoff, but we find no evidence of discontinuities in the average value of observable characteristics of mothers. Moreover, we find no discontinuities in birth procedures such as inductions and cesarean sections, implying that every induction used to move a delivery before cutoff is balanced by an additional induction after the cutoff. This pattern seems very unlikely, given that inductions can only be used to hasten deliveries, not to delay them. With our two statistical tests of birth densities and birth covariates taken together, it is difficult to imagine a scenario under which birth timing is occurring but not measured in our large population of births.
Discussion and Conclusions
Using the population of births in the U.S. from 1999 to 2004, we estimate flexible models intended to identify whether parents and physicians manipulate the timing of births in the neighborhood of state-level school entrance cutoff dates. Our analysis suggests that no such manipulation takes place, even among births and obstetric procedures that are likely to be most susceptible to timing. Two distinct but related empirical strategies, one based on the identification of discontinuities of the density of births and the other based on discontinuities in the average characteristics of mothers, babies, and births, fail to find evidence of birth timing. Why is the response to the incentive provided by school cutoff laws so much smaller than the response to tax-and transfer-based incentives? First, the child care cost savings that accompany school entry, $2500 on average according to Datar (2006b) , are deferred until five years after a child's birth. These future expenses may be further discounted because of the possibility of moving to a state with a different entrance cutoff. Moreover, low income families, for whom the child care costs are most burdensome, may not respond to these incentives if they tend to have relatively high discount rates. A lack of information may also play a role in finding little response to the incentive -unlike the transfer analyzed by Gans and Leigh (2009) , which was essentially common knowledge among expectant parents, knowledge of school age eligibility requirements is likely much less widespread.
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18
Finally, our findings suggest that studies relying on the timing of births as an exogenous source of variation of a treatment of interest, such as school entrance age or grade level at a particular age, are likely based on a sound identification strategy. Specifications using the universe of births from 1999 to 2004 reveal no evidence of precise sorting around school cutoff dates or of discontinuities in parental characteristics that are likely to influence child outcomes.
This finding must be interpreted with two caveats. First, because medical technology (and possibly underlying parental preferences) has rapidly evolved in recent decades, our findings 17 Deming and Dynarski (2008) show that the prevalence of redshirting dramatically increased in the past 20 years, based in part on parents' beliefs that entrance age causally affects achievement. Black et al. (2008) and Elder and Lubotsky (2009) provide strong evidence that these effects do not persist into secondary schooling and adulthood. 18 Seven states and DC mandate schooling for children aged five, which would make redshirting impossible. Among these seven states, Arkansas, Connecticut, and Delaware do not have one of the five cutoffs used in our analyses. Along with DC, the remaining states are New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Virginia. When we exclude these states in order to gauge how their inclusion affects the estimates, we find no significant changes (either practically or statistically) relative to the baseline case.
may not be generalizable to years since 2004. Second, when school cutoffs fall adjacent to a weekend, students born on or just before cutoffs may be systematically different from those born immediately afterward because of the variation of the composition of births by day of the week. Source: Authors' calculations from the Fall 1998 survey assessment of ECLS-K. [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] . 
